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Abstract 
Why is social exclusion a problem? What about ‘voluntary’ social exclusion – 
when an individual chooses to exclude him or herself from the wider society? 
Brain Barry has addressed these questions in a recent CASE book, arguing that 
social exclusion, voluntary or involuntary, offends against social justice and 
social solidarity. This paper contends that Barry’s arguments are weak for 
voluntary social exclusion and argues that, perhaps surprisingly, a better case 
can be made for treating voluntary social exclusion as a problem on welfarist 
grounds.   
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Introduction 
Why is social exclusion a problem? Why should we care about an individual 
‘who does not participate in key activities of the society in which he or she 
lives’ – one definition of the socially excluded (Burchardt, Le Grand and 
Piachaud, 2002, p.30)? Does our concern arise from some kind of simple 
utilitarian or welfarist calculus: the excluded are miserable, and therefore we 
need to include them in society so as raise their welfare and thereby promote the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number? But what if the socially excluded are 
not in fact miserable? After all, not everyone necessarily wishes to participate in 
the ‘key activities of society’, whatever these may be. In particular, what if an 
individual or a group of individuals have voluntarily chosen to exclude 
themselves? What of the recluse who prefers solitude to human company, the 
religious sect that values its exclusivity, the young men on a run down public 
housing estate who prefer to join a criminal gang rather than go to university? 
At the other end of the social scale, what of the rich who lock themselves away 
in gated communities? All of these individuals and groups may not be 
participating in the key activities of society; but do they all constitute a social 
problem? If so, is it the same kind of social problem as those who are socially 
excluded for reasons beyond their control, and what kind of problem is that? 
 
Brian Barry has addressed some of these questions in a recent contribution to a 
CASE study of social exclusion (Barry, 2002). There he related social exclusion 
to the issues of justice and democracy. But the questions are also of even more 
general concern. The problem of the relationship between choice, poverty and 
social exclusion has bedevilled academic political and popular debate on the 
issue for (literally) millennia. As far back as the Roman Empire politicians and 
policy-makers have wanted to distinguish between the ‘undeserving poor’ 
(those poor from choice) from the ‘deserving’ poor (those who are poor through 
no fault of their own). With the current resurgence of belief in individual agency 
and responsibility (Deacon and Mann, 1999), the political interest in attaching 
notions of responsibilities to rights, and the contributions of Amartya Sen 
(1994, 1995) and others emphasising the importance of the distribution of 
‘capabilities’ rather than actual incomes, the debate concerning the importance 
of choice and its relationship to distributional outcomes has re-ignited.  
 
So in this paper I want to pursue the general question as to the relationship 
between individual choice and social exclusion, and in doing so to shed light on 
the question as to why social exclusion is a problem worthy of concern. I begin 
with Barry’s arguments as to why social exclusion is wrong from the points of 
view of justice and democracy, and relate these to the question of choice. I 
conclude that, whatever their merits as arguments for labelling involuntary 
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social exclusion as a problem, they do not provide a strong case for treating 
voluntary social exclusion as one. I then demonstrate that, perhaps surprisingly, 
a better case can be made on welfarist grounds for viewing some forms of 
voluntary social exclusion as a proper subject of social concern, especially that 
with long-term implications for individuals’ futures. There is a brief concluding 
section. 
 
Exclusion, Democracy and Justice 
Brian Barry begins his discussion of why social exclusion is undesirable with a 
definition of social exclusion originally put forward by the present author, as 
follows: ‘An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically 
resident in a society, (b) he or she cannot participate in the normal activities of 
citizens in that society, and (c) he or she would like to so participate, but is 
prevented from doing so by factors beyond his or her control’ (Burchardt, Le 
Grand and Piachaud, 1999, p.229). Under this interpretation, voluntary social 
exclusion is excluded (so to speak), because of condition (c). Barry accepts this 
definition; but he also points out that it is important to distinguish conceptually 
between voluntary and involuntary social exclusion, and draws out the 
implications for both types of social exclusion in his subsequent argument. 
 
Barry puts forward two reasons why social exclusion is wrong. The first is 
because exclusion dilutes social solidarity – defined by Barry as a sense of 
fellow feeling that extends beyond people with whom one is in personal contact. 
Social exclusionary processes do this because they prevent the excluded from 
sharing in the commonality of experience that is the foundation of social 
solidarity. And this in turn is a bad thing, partly because social solidarity is 
‘intrinsically valuable’, and partly because an absence of social solidarity 
creates a problem for democratic politics. It is intrinsically valuable because 
‘human lives tend to go better in a society whose members share some kind of 
existence’.1 It affects democratic politics, because in democratic societies, 
majority interests dominate. In a society without social solidarity, there is no 
reason to suppose those interests will coincide with those of the socially 
excluded; indeed, depending on the reason for the exclusion, the interests of the 
majority and the excluded are likely to diverge. Hence democratic procedures 
will result in majorities having both the means and – due to the absence of 
solidarity - the inclination to oppress socially excluded minorities. 
 
                                         
1
  Barry (2002, p.24). Actually, this sounds more like a consequentialist justification for 
social solidarity (and a utilitarian one at that) than an ‘intrinsic’ one; but let that pass. 
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However, in Barry’s view, social exclusion is not only wrong because it violates 
social solidarity and thereby harms democracy. It is also unjust. The injustice 
arises because social exclusion can create inequality of opportunity, especially 
with respect to education and work. Obviously, the poverty associated with 
most forms of social exclusion creates educational barriers: hunger and 
malnutrition, crowded conditions at home, family pressures to go out and earn 
money, all make it difficult for children in poor families to make the most of 
their educational opportunities. But also the social homogeneity of socially 
excluded communities creates educational problems of its own. So, for instance, 
children going to local schools with a large number of pupils from socially 
deprived neighbourhoods will, other things being equal, perform less well than 
if they had attended schools with a critical mass of middle class pupils.  
 
The problem is not only one of education. To live in social isolation or to live in 
a socially isolated group cuts the individual concerned off from the networks 
that are often key to obtaining jobs. Barry quotes William Julius Wilson on 
inner city isolation, which ‘makes it much difficult for those who are looking 
for jobs to be tied into the job network’:2 a phenomenon that, as Barry points 
out, is not confined to the inner city. Further, the lack of job opportunities itself 
depresses educational aspirations, thus contributing further to inequalities in 
educational opportunity. 
 
Barry also argues that a further aspect of injustice created by social exclusion 
concerns political opportunities and hence the workings of democracy. As with 
education, the deprivation associated with social exclusion can impede people’s 
ability to engage in political activities. And, as with jobs, the absence of 
contacts with social networks significantly impedes both their knowledge of, 
and their participation in, politics outside election times. All of this damages 
democracy. 
 
This emphasis on social justice as equality of opportunity is very welcome to 
those of us who have argued for some time that social injustice or inequity was 
best interpreted in terms of inequalities in opportunities or choice sets.3 
However, its use in the context of the justification for treating social exclusion 
as a problem does itself create a difficulty for voluntary social exclusion for it 
implies that those who voluntarily exclude themselves are not a social problem. 
Thus the individual who makes a conscious, properly informed decision not to 
go to university or to take up a training opportunity, and in consequence ends up 
unemployed and living on a rundown public housing estate, may be socially 
                                         
2
  Wilson (1987, p.60), quoted in Barry (2002, p.20). 
3
  Le Grand (1984, 1991), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989). 
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excluded. But his or her exclusion is not socially problematic because, as a 
consequence of his or her own choices, it is not unjust. 
 
Barry is aware of this issue, and indeed draws attention to it (Barry, 2002, p.23). 
He argues that it does not apply to the second pillar of his justificatory edifice: 
the appeal to social solidarity. For solidarity is clearly violated by social 
exclusion; whether the exclusion is voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant. 
However, it has to be said that, even here, the possibility of individual choice 
presents a problem. For if some individuals have voluntarily decided to exclude 
themselves from society, any move to include them is going to be against their 
expressed will. Hence such moves are likely to involve a measure of coercion; 
and that is unlikely to foster feelings in the people concerned of social 
solidarity. 
 
So the possibility that individuals may choose to exclude themselves from 
normal society creates problems for Barry’s two justifications for the overall 
undesirability of social exclusion. Voluntary social exclusion is not unjust or 
inequitable, because it arises from choice. And, although voluntary exclusion 
may indeed violate social solidarity, any attempt to correct the situation is likely 
to create resentment and thereby dilute solidarity yet further. 
 
Choice and Welfare 
So if Barry’s arguments for the undesirability of social exclusion based on the 
concerns of social justice and social solidarity do not apply to voluntary 
exclusion, can any justification for regarding exclusion by choice as 
problematic be found elsewhere? One possibility is a ‘welfarist’ one: that is, the 
impact of social exclusion on the welfare of individuals. Now it might at first 
seem curious to consider welfarism as a possible source of such justification; for 
individuals who choose to exclude themselves are presumably doing it because 
they want to. Hence their welfare is raised by voluntary social exclusion; and so 
it would appear that such exclusion cannot be a problem from a welfarist 
perspective.  
 
However, there are a number of situations where these arguments might not 
hold, and indeed where the opposite case could be made. The most obvious of 
these is what we might term ‘externalities’: when the act of voluntary social 
exclusion, although increasing the chooser’s own welfare, damages other 
people’s welfare. An example would be young men joining a gang that engaged 
in crime, vandalism or other anti-social activities. Another might be the wealthy 
locking themselves away in gated estates, thereby physically depriving others of 
what could be communal facilities and creating resentment in the rest of the 
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community. Indeed Barry’s appeal to the ‘intrinsic’ value of social solidarity 
could also be justified on externality grounds: if social solidarity contributes to 
everyone’s welfare, then for some people to opt out diminishes that welfare.  
 
It is worth noting that those rather closer to the actual experience of social 
exclusion than most academics can share this view that exclusion has an 
externality effect. An in-depth study of the views of thirty residents of poor 
public housing estates found that these residents felt that any person 
experiencing exclusion (whether they have had a hand in it or not) also caused 
wider society a problem in terms of the threat such divisions pose to social 
solidarity. While the group distinguished between the voluntary withdrawal by 
better off individuals and the voluntary social exclusion of people facing 
disadvantage, such as through benefit fraud or criminal activity, they were 
critical of both types of divisive outcome (Richardson and Le Grand, 2002).  
 
So there is a welfarist case for regarding even voluntary social exclusion as 
undesirable because of the externality effect. But there are also cases where 
voluntary acts may not necessarily increase the welfare of the individual making 
the choice him or herself. Barry himself deals with one case where we might 
observe an apparently voluntary act of self-exclusion but nonetheless regard it 
as neither furthering the individual’s own welfare nor, of more concern to his 
argument, social justice. This is when the opportunity or choice set is small or 
when the alternatives it contains are pretty meagre. If an individual only has two 
unpalatable choices (‘your money or your life’) then if he or she chooses one of 
them (such as giving up the money), it would be odd to judge the outcome as 
promoting individual welfare or even a just one simply because it was the 
product of a choice. Likewise, if a young black man from a public housing 
estate encounters hostility and discrimination whenever he ventures into white 
society, and decides to withdraw from that society and its institutions by, for 
instance, refusing an opportunity to go to university, it would be hard to 
describe this as welfare-enhancing or as socially just, simply on the grounds that 
he had chosen to do it. Rather it is in the limited size and quality of the choice 
set open to him that the problem lies. Social exclusion that is the result of 
decisions made over limited opportunities limits welfare and is also unjust – and 
therefore socially undesirable. In these situations, simply increasing the choice 
set of the individual concerned is likely to reduce social exclusion, increase 
individual welfare, promote social justice, and, through rendering the 
opportunities open to all society’s members more similar, likely to increase 
social solidarity. 
 
Similar arguments apply when decisions are made with poor information. If the 
university that offered the young man a place was in fact a haven of non-
discrimination but he did not know this, then again it would be hard to describe 
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his situation as welfare-promoting or just. Or, to take a broader case, if some 
individuals chose not to go to university because they did not know about the 
likely extra income that they could earn over their lifetimes if they went, then 
again it is hard to hold them responsible for their decisions. Acts of ‘voluntary’ 
social exclusion that result from choice sets that are either small or accompanied 
by poor information cannot be justified by reference either to social welfare or 
to social justice. 
 
The public housing residents whose views on social exclusion were explored in 
the study mentioned above agreed with this view. For instance, those who chose 
to join a youth gang: 
‘may not be happy [really] they are bolstering each other – it’s 
mutual support for hardships’ 
Therefore such participation cannot be considered an equivalent alternative for 
participation in mainstream society (Richardson and Le Grand, 2002, p. 500). 
 
More difficult cases arise when properly informed individuals with reasonably 
sized choice sets make voluntary decisions. Are there reasons for, in some 
circumstances, not accepting that the individual concerned is happier as a result 
of those decisions? Is it possible that, even if properly informed individuals 
judge themselves to be happier living outside the wider society, both they and 
society would actually be better off if they were brought inside? 
 
Bill New (1999) has identified four possible cases where we might make such a 
judgement.4 The first is where there is a technical inability to complete the 
necessary mental tasks. This inability could arise because the quantity of 
information is simply too great, relative to mental capacity, or because the 
technological or causal connections are too difficult to make, again relative to 
capacity. This appears to be a special problem with respect to long-term 
decision-making. For this involves assessing the probabilities of benefit or harm 
from alternative courses of action. And experimental evidence suggests that 
individuals often find it difficult to make rational decisions where weighing up 
probabilities are concerned (Tversky and Kahneman 1982). 
 
                                         
4
  For a critique of New, see Calcott (2000). For further discussion of individual failure 
in different contexts, see Le Grand (2003), Chs. 5 and 6. 
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A second source of individual failure identified by New is weakness of the will. 
This is where individuals know what they prefer in the long term but still make 
short-term decisions that are not in their long-term interest. Addiction, and more 
generally substance misuse, could be considered an example of this.5 
 
A third source of individual failure is emotional decision-making. Becoming 
attached to certain choices allows emotions to distort decisions. This might arise 
because of a strong attachment to a particular outcome even though one knows 
that it is very unlikely to occur; or the decision may be made in a period of 
stress, such as that following bereavement.  
 
The fourth problem raised by New concerns the relationship between 
preferences and experience. Preferences over a set of decisions might be 
different if the individual had actual experience (as distinct from abstract 
knowledge or information) of the outcomes of the decision concerned from that 
if he or she had no such experience. But some experiences are largely or wholly 
impossible to repeat. Thus the decision whether to go to university or not might 
be different if it were possible for the individual concerned actually to have the 
experience of having been to university before the decision was taken; but this 
is not a feasible option. At first sight, this resembles the poor information 
concern discussed above. But it is not quite the same; for, unlike in the cases 
considered in that context, no system can supply the relevant information prior 
to the decision being taken. 
 
How do these potential ‘individual failures’ (so-called so as to distinguish them 
from market or other types of system failure) affect the voluntary decision to 
self-exclude? This will clearly depend upon the situation and the individuals 
concerned. However, there is an important generalisation that can be made. This 
is that these ‘failures’ are more likely to apply to be a problem when major 
decisions with long-term implications are concerned, than when more minor 
decisions that only have short-term consequences are involved. In part this is 
simply a matter of scale: the potential damage done by a mistake in making a 
big decision that affects one’s whole future (such as whether or not to go to 
university) is obviously greater than that from a mistake involving a smaller 
short-term decision (such as whether to go to an isolated retreat for a week). But 
also some of the individual failures above are more likely to involve long-term 
                                         
5
  The phenomenon of addiction obviously presents problems for any analysis of the 
status of individual choice. Again the public housing residents have interesting views 
on this: they argued that initially the people concerned could be said to be excluding 
themselves partly out of choice, but after they become addicted, the 
exclusion/problems they face are more beyond their control (Richardson and Le 
Grand, 2002, p.502). 
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decision-making. So, for instance, technical incapacity is more problematic 
when long-term decision-making involving the weighing up of probabilities is 
concerned; and weakness of the will frequently manifests itself as a way of 
prioritising of short-term interests over long-term ones. 
 
Failures in major long-term decision-making may result from another problem: 
that of myopia. Individuals may make wrong decisions about self-exclusion, 
because they are too short-sighted to take proper account of the future. Myopia 
is a common phenomenon. Individuals’ time horizons are limited. They do not 
always consider the long-term; they plan only on the basis of current events, or 
on their predictions of the very immediate future. In a word, they are myopic.  
 
Now, although this sounds like another form of individual failure, it is actually 
somewhat different. Here some of the arguments of Derek Parfit (1984) 
concerning the nature of personal identity have relevance. Parfit’s arguments 
about identity run something like this. We normally invoke the concept of 
personal identity to link a person in one time period with the ‘same’ person in 
another, later period. But what does the concept of personal identity actually 
mean? It presumably does not mean what a possible literal interpretation of the 
words in the phrase personal identity would mean: that is, the person in the first 
time period is identical in every respect to the person in the second. The person 
will have aged physically; external factors (such as income or family status) 
may have changed; tastes may have changed; aspects of personality may have 
changed. The extent and magnitude of these changes may be small if the 
distance between the time periods is small, but they are likely to increase with 
that distance: compare the physique, income, personal relations, and personality 
of an eight year-old with that of the ‘same’ person eighty years later. 
 
So if it does not mean actual identity, what does personal identity mean? Parfit’s 
answer is a reductionist one: that is, the ‘fact’ of personal identity can be 
reduced to some other facts that can be described without using the concept of 
personal identity. These facts, according to Parfit, are links of a psychological 
kind, principally those of intention and memory. For instance, a twenty year old 
will have memories of her nineteen year old self; and certain features of her 
current existence will depend on the intentions and actions of that nineteen year 
old. These links are, according to Parfit, what makes the twenty and nineteen 
year old the ‘same’ person. Similar phenomena would link the eight and eighty-
eight year old mentioned above; but here the phenomena (and therefore the 
links) would be much attenuated. Hence any argument that was based on the 
continuity of the self would be much weaker for the eighty year gap than for the 
one year gap. 
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What are the implications of this for the myopia argument? Simply that a 
certain degree of myopia may not be an ‘individual failure’. If people are related 
to their future selves by links that become progressively attenuated the more 
distant the future, then it seems quite rational to give those future selves less 
weight than their present selves. There is no individual failure in the sense of 
irrational decision-making. 
 
But this in turn means that there is a justification for treating long-term 
decision-making as a social problem. For there is a group of people who have 
no say in such decisions but who are affected by those who make them: there is 
an externality. An individual’s future self is a person who is directly affected by 
that individual’s current decisions in the market place. A 65 year old may be 
poor because of myopic decisions taken by her 25 year old self. Hence the 25 
year old is imposing costs on the 65 year old through her decisions; but the 65 
year has no say in those decisions. There is an externality. 
 
An individual’s future self is, of course, someone with whom her current self is 
linked. But the link is not as strong as that to her present self. Hence, in taking 
those current decisions she will not give appropriate weight to the interests of 
her future self, in a similar fashion as if her future self was actually a different 
person. More specifically, because she is not giving her future self the same 
weight as that future self would if the latter were present at the point of 
decision, she will undertake actions relating to the balance of interests between 
present and future self that are not ‘optimal’ from the point of view of aggregate 
welfare. 
 
Conclusion 
What are the implications of all of this for voluntary social exclusion and the 
extent to which this is a social problem? It suggests two things. First, voluntary 
social exclusion may be a problem if we believe there to be a significant degree 
of externality and/or of individual failure in making the relevant decisions. 
Second, the problem is more likely to occur with respect to decisions involving 
voluntary social exclusion that have implications for the long-term future of the 
individual concerned. For it is here that both individual failure and the myopia 
externality are more likely. 
 
Of course, one cannot deduce from this directly that government intervention is 
necessarily required to correct this problem. For there is no guarantee that such 
intervention will make things better. So, for instance, governments elected by 
myopic individuals may behave just as myopically as the individuals 
themselves. As so often in public policy, we are searching for the least worst 
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alternative; and finding that alternative requires empirical as well as 
philosophical investigation. That will have to be the subject of another paper.  
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